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L JURISDICTION 
Summary judgment on the claims against Energy West was entered in its favor on 
February 19, 2009. (R. 303-07). Notice of Appeal was filed March 12, 2009. (R. 309). 
The Utah Supreme Court transferred the appeal on March 19, 2009. (R. 322), establishing 
jurisdiction in this court pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) . 
n. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: In light of the express subcontract governing the subject of the litigation 
and the legal remedies created thereby, and the undisputed fact that Energy West paid its 
general contract in full, whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment 
against Nickerson on its quantum meruit claims. 
Issue 2: Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of 
Energy West on Nickerson's claim for repossession. 
Standard of Review: Summary judgment is available when "there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law." UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(c). The court reviews summary judgment for correctness, 
without deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Shattuck-Owen v. Snowbird 
Corp., 2000 UT 94, ^ 9, 16 P.3d 555, 558 (citations omitted). The court views the facts 
and their "reasonable inferences" in a light favorable to the party opposing summary 
judgment. Id. (citations omitted). Review thus consists of two questions: whether the 
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material facts were disputed and whether the court correctly applied the law. Woodbury 
Amsource, Inc. v. Salt Lake County, 2003 UT 28, 1|4>73 P.3d 362, 364 (citations omitted). 
Preservation of the issues: Nickerson's summary judgment motion on all claims 
against Energy West is at R. 171-200. Energy West's combined opposition and cross-
motion on all claims is at R. 202-83, and its undisputed facts are at R. 238-39. Its legal 
arguments are at R. 241-45. Nickerson's opposition to the cross-motion is at R. 285-88. 
III. DETERMINATIVE RULES 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(c) (relevant part) 
The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 7(c)(3)(A) 
A memorandum supporting a motion for summary judgment shall contain a 
statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends no 
genuine issue exists. Each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and 
supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery 
materials. Each fact set forth in the moving party's memorandum is deemed 
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless controverted by the 
responding party. 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 7(c)(3)(B) (relevant part) 
A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall contain a 
verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is 
controverted, and may contain a separate statement of additional facts in 
dispute. For each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, the 
opposing party shall provide an explanation of the grounds for any dispute, 
supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery 
materials. 
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IV, STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: Nickerson brought this action to collect payment for 
equipment installed at a construction project pursuant to a subcontract with the project 
general contractor, Weyher Construction Company. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below: Nickerson filed this action on 
January 6, 2006, naming only Weyher Construction, the general contractor. (R. 1-2). 
Nickerson filed an amended complaint effective July 20, 2007, adding Energy West, 
Genwal Resources, Inc. and Employers Mutual Casualty Co. (R. 68-73). Only Energy 
West was served with process on the amended complaint, and it answered and cross-
claimed in December, 2007. (R. 96-105).1 Nickerson never served Employers Mutual. 
(R. 239 T|ll; 285-88). Nickerson obtained an unopposed summary judgment against 
Weyher on April 3, 2008. (R. 153-54). Nickerson filed its summary judgment motion 
against Energy West on October 23, 2008. (R. 171). Energy West responded and cross-
moved for summary judgment. (R. 202-83). The trial court entered summary judgment 
for Energy West and denied Nickerson's motion on February 19, 2009. (R. 303-08). 
Nickerson did not pursue its claims against Genwal or Employers Mutual. (Record, 
passim). 
1
 Energy West served Employers Mutual with the cross-claim but permitted an indefinite 
extension of time in which to answer. The gravamen of the claims against Employers 
Mutual was for contract-based indemnity based on the latter's payment and performance 
bond obligations. (R. 100-04). Upon entry of summary judgment in favor of Energy 
West on plaintiffs claims, the indemnity claims were effectively mooted. Accordingly, 
an answer to the cross-claim was never required. 
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V. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Energy West is a wholly owned subsidiary of PacifiCorp and conducts coal 
mining in Utah. Castle Valley Special Service District (CVSSD) operates and maintains 
the culinary and secondary water systems for the cities of Huntington, Elmo, and 
Cleveland, Utah. The Little Bear Spring is a water supply source for CVSSD and those 
three cities. As a condition for its mining permit, Energy West was required to mitigate 
the potential impact on the Little Bear Spring. (R. 239-401ffll-4). 
To satisfy that mitigation requirement, Energy West, Genwal Resources, Inc. and 
Castle Valley Special Service District ("CVSSD") in April of 2004 entered into an 
agreement for the construction of an addition to CVSSD's water treatment plant (the 
"Project"). (R. 238 f 1). Energy West and Genwal agreed shortly thereafter to share the 
cost of the Project. Id. ^2. Weyher was hired as the Project general contractor. Id. [^3 
Weyher provided Payment and Performance Bonds, naming Energy West and Genwal as 
"owner" pursuant to sections 14-1-18 and 19 of the Utah Code. (R. 238-39 «|4, R. 228, R 
231). Employers Mutual Insurance Company was the bond obligor. Id. 
Weyher subcontracted with Nickerson to supply certain pumps and associated 
hardware for installation at the Project. (R. 239 %5). Weyher ordered the pumps from 
Nickerson on or about August 5, 2004. Id. f6. Nickerson's pumps were delivered and 
installed on May 4, 2005. Id. ^7. CVSSD accepted the completed Project in its entirety 
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on August 23, 2005. Id. T[8; R. 261. Energy West paid Weyher in full for the Project. (R. 
239 f9,R. 305 1J9,R. 218^10). 
Claiming it was never paid for the pumps, Nickerson sued Weyher in January, 
2006. Nickerson filed an Amended Complaint on June 28, 2007, adding Energy West, 
Genwal and Employers Mutual but never served Employers Mutual or otherwise pursued 
a claim on the Payment Bond. (R. 239 \\ 1). Nickerson's unopposed summary judgment 
motion against Weyher based on breach of contract resulted in an award for the full 
amount of the claim and interest on April 24, 2008. (R. 153, 157, 239 Tfl2). 
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Nickerson's express contract with Weyher precludes reliance on equitable 
remedies under quantum meruit against Energy West. It is inconsequential that Energy 
West benefited because of Nickerson's pumps. Having paid its contract price for the 
entire Project, Energy West received no unjust benefit. Furthermore, Nickerson failed to 
pursue, let alone exhaust, its statutory legal remedy against the Payment Bond. That 
failure by itself bars the quantum meruit claims against Energy West. It is unfortunate 
that Weyher is apparently insolvent. But that fact creates no cognizable claim against 
Energy West, and neither does the fact that Energy West resolved a payment dispute with 
Weyher after this action was filed. 
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VII. ARGUMENT 
Seeking summary judgment on its own claims, Nickerson first had to demonstrate 
with available discovery materials that there were no triable issues and then "establish the 
essential facts necessary to support [its] claim . . .," Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ^|9, 177 
P.3d 600, 602; UTAH R. Civ. P. 56(c), meaning that all legal elements must be satisfied. 
Id. at fflO, 13. Cross-moving on the claims against it, Energy West "had the initial 
burden of demonstrating that there was no issue of material fact and that [it was] entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law." Borghetti v. Sys. & Computer Tech., 2008 UT 77, ^ [14, 
199 P.3d 907, 912. That accomplished, "the burden then shift[ed] to [Nickerson] to 
present evidence that [was] sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact." Id., 
quoting Eagar v. Burrows, 2008 UT 42, f 15, 191 P.3d 9, 11 (additional cite omitted). 
A. The material facts describing the relationships among the parties were 
undisputed, thereby establishing and limiting the basis for potential 
claims. 
Opposition to a properly supported Rule 56 motion requires a detailed, record-
based, factual refutation. Specifically, Nickerson was required to repeat "verbatim" the 
controverted facts with "an explanation of the grounds for any dispute, supported by 
citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials." UTAH R. Civ. P. 
7(c)(3)(B). A material fact is either disputed according to the rule or it is admitted for 
purposes of the motion. Id. at (c)(3)(A)("Each fact set forth in the moving party's 
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memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless 
controverted by the responding party."). 
Energy West's principle memorandum stated the material facts supported by 
proper record cites. (R. 238-39 ^flfl-12). Nickerson failed to address, much less 
controvert, any of them. (R. 285-88). The court adopted those facts in their entirety. (R. 
304-305, Tffll-12). Several of Nickerson's proposed facts, on the other hand, lacked 
evidentiary cites. 
Distilled, the cross-motions turned on seven undisputed facts: 
1. Energy West contracted with Weyher. (R. 23 8 %3; 218 f7). 
2. Weyher subcontracted with Nickerson for delivery of the Project pumps. (R. 286 
("The only express contract [with Nickerson] is between [Nickerson and 
Weyher]"); R. 121 H6-7; R- 173 1ffl5, 7, 9). 
3. Weyher provided a Payment Bond for the Project, naming Energy West and 
Genwal as "owner" pursuant to sections 14-1-18 and 19 of the Utah Code. (R. 
238-39 Tf4;R. 228). 
2
 Nickerson's principal memorandum contained fourteen paragraphs of what it claimed 
were "undisputed facts." (R. 172-175). We pointed out that paragraphs 5, a portion of 8, 
and 13 were based on citations to letters, none of which were authenticated and all of 
which were hearsay, but used as though they were sworn affidavits. (R. 237-38). We 
waived that defect for purposes of the cross-motions, however, only because the "facts" 
Nickerson claimed to establish with the inadmissible evidence failed to establish a basis 
for a claim against Energy West. They functioned instead as admissions supporting 
Energy West's cross-motion. (R. 237). 
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4. Employers Mutual was the Payment Bond obligor. (R. 238-39 ^4; R. 228 and 
231). 
5. Nickerson's pumps were delivered and installed on May 4, 2005. (R. 207 f 11; 
31417). 
6. CVSSD assumed full ownership and operation of the treatment facilities the 
following August. (R. 23918; R. 218 f9; R. 234, R. 261). 
7. Energy West paid its contract in full. (R. 23919; R. 218 f 10; R. 278 (depo. p. 33). 
Applying hornbook law to these facts shows that Nickerson had no claims against 
Energy West. 
B. Based on the undisputed facts, Energy West was entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law on Nickerson's quantum meruit theories. 
Energy West obtained summary judgment on each of the claims against it—unjust 
enrichment, contract implied in law and repossession. (R. 305-06, and see R. 70-72) 
The claims are addressed in turn. 
1. Nickerson's express subcontract with Weyher bars the unjust 
enrichment claim against Energy West, 
Quantum meruit is equity's restitutionary answer when a party is enriched by but 
does not pay for the services of another. Its two branches—contract implied in fact and 
contract implied in law—supply theories of recovery where there is no express contract 
or other legal remedy. EPIC v. Salt Lake County, 2007 UT 72, TflO, 167 P.3d 1080, 1083. 
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Unjust enrichment is just another name for the remedy of contract implied in law. 
Id. See also TruGreen Cos. v. Mower Brothers, 2008 UT 81, f 18, 199 P.3d 929, 933 
(citation omitted). The remedy is equity-based, "used only when no express contract is 
present." Id., citing American Towers Owners Assfn v. CCI Mech, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 
1193 (Utah 1996). 
Three elements form an unjust enrichment claim: 
First, there must be a benefit conferred by one person on another. [] 
Second, the conferee must appreciate or have knowledge of the 
benefit. [] [Third], there must be 'the acceptance or retention by the 
conferee of the benefit under such circumstances as to make it 
inequitable for the conferee to retain the benefit without payment of 
its value.' 
Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B&L Auto, Inc., 2000 UT 83, ^[13, 12 P.3d 580, 582 (citation 
omitted). 
Unjust enrichment is thus the basis for an equitable remedy "where one does not 
exist at law." American Towers, 930 P.2d at 1192. Recovery under an equity theory 
"presupposes that no enforceable written or oral contract exists." Davies v. Olson, 746 
P.2d 264, 268 (Utah App. 1987). With a legal remedy available, therefore, "such as for 
breach of an express contract, the law will not imply the equitable remedy of unjust 
enrichment." Id. at 1193, quoting Mann v. American Western Life Ins. Co., 586 P.2d 461, 
465 (Utah 1978)("Recovery in quasi contract is not available where there is an express 
contract covering the subject matter of the litigation."). 
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Nickerson's contract rights and duties relative to the Project were defined in its 
express, enforceable subcontract with Weyher. (R. 286)("The only express contract [with 
Nickerson] is between [Nickerson and Weyher]"); R. 121 ffi[6-7; R. 173 ^ | 5 , 7, 9; see 
also Nickerson Brf. at 12). Nickerson recognized as much when it obtained summary 
judgment against Weyher on its breach of contract claim. (R. 153, 157, 239 Tfl2). That 
express contract with Weyher bars Nickerson's resort to an equitable remedy against— 
based on a manufactured contract with—Energy West. The law does not, of course, 
guarantee that Nickerson's action for breach of that express contract will result in 
payment. It only guarantees a legal remedy in the form of an award of damages, as 
happened in this case. (R. 153, 157-58, 305 f 12; Nickerson Brf. at 12). 
2. Nickerson's failure to exhaust its legal remedies barred any quantum 
meruit claim against Energy West. 
Recovery under quantum meruit requires that any available legal remedies be first 
exhausted. Knight v. Post, 748 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah App. 1988)("[0]ne must first 
exhaust his legal remedies before he may recover on the basis of the equitable doctrine of 
quantum meruit."). 
Nickerson had the best possible legal remedy fully available to it from the 
inception of the Project, namely the Payment Bond. (R. 304 f4). That bond obligated 
Employers Mutual as follows, with the proper names inserted: 
If [Weyher] . . . fails to pay for any materials, equipment, or other supplies . 
. .used in connection with the performance of work contracted to be done, 
or for amounts due under applicable State law for any work or labor 
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thereon, [Employers Mutual] will pay for the same in an amount not 
exceeding [$1,333,277] and, in the event suit is brought upon this bond, a 
reasonable attorney's fee to be fixed by the court. This bond shall inure to 
the benefit of any persons, companies, or corporations entitled to file claims 
under applicable State law. 
(R. 228). 
The "applicable State law" invoked by the Payment Bond is Utah Code Ann. §14-
2-1. That section creates a "right of action" on the payment bond for anyone who 
furnishes "equipment or material" on a "commercial contract for which the payment bond 
is furnished . . . ." UTAH CODE ANN. § 14-2-l(4)(a). The action is time-barred, however, 
if not commenced within a year after the equipment or material is last supplied. Id. § 
(5)(b)(ii). 
Nickerson's pumps were "installed and tested and accepted" on May 4, 2005. (R. 
207 f 11, 239 \l). Its payment bond claim thus lapsed a year later, in May 2006, four full 
months after it filed this action. (R. 1). In other words, Nickerson knew it had not been 
paid and sued to collect, but while the action was pending allowed its best legal remedy 
to lapse. Then, in July 2007, Nickerson obtained leave to amend to add Employers 
Mutual, more than a year late. (R. 64, R. 76-77). Cf. Commercial Fixtures & 
Furnishings, Inc. v. Adams, 564 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah 1977)(plaintiff sued only upon the 
equitable theory of unjust enrichment "without any attempt to exhaust any legal remedies 
available."). 
Explaining why Employers Mutual was never served. (R. 305 f 11). 
458051vl 
-11-
Nickerson seems to have chosen between two available legal remedies—a breach 
claim against Weyher or an action on the Payment Bond—as though they were mutually 
exclusive. It did not have to choose; it could have, and plainly should have, pursued 
both.4 
3. The identical claim for contract implied in law (Claim III) was likewise 
barred due to Nickerson's express subcontract and its failure to 
exhaust legal remedies. 
Repeating the unjust enrichment claim, Nickerson pled a "contract implied in law" 
theory against Energy West. (R. 71). A contract implied in law, however, is merely 
another name for unjust enrichment. Promax Dev. Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 259 
(Utah App. 1997), cert, denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1997). See also Davies, 746 P.2d at 
269 (quantum meruit has two distinct branches: contract implied in fact and contract 
implied in law, also known as unjust enrichment or quasi-contract). It is the same claim 
as unjust enrichment. Id.5 The design is "to prevent the defendant's enrichment at the 
plaintiffs expense." Id. (citation omitted). 
Accordingly, this claim was properly rejected for the reasons already stated. 
Nickerson states that it made "[cjlaims on the bonds" after obtaining its judgment 
against Weyher. (Nickerson Brf. at 12). It is not clear what Nickerson means by 
"claims," but it is undisputed that Nickerson did not timely sue on the Payment Bond. 
(R. 305 TJH). 
5
 "To establish a contract implied in law or a quasi-contract, the plaintiff must show (1) 
the defendant received a benefit; (2) an appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of 
the benefit; (3) under circumstances that would make it unjust for the defendant to retain 
the benefit without paying for it." Promax Dev. Corp., 943 P.2d at 259. Cf. with R. 269-
70, ^fl}20-25)(Nickerson's unjust enrichment claim). 
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4. There were no circumstances such that equity required Energy West to 
answer for Weyher's obligation. 
Because of its express subcontract concerning the pumps, Nickerson's only hope 
on the unjust enrichment theory was to demonstrate "some misleading act, request for 
services, or the like" by Energy West to Nickerson that resulted in some unpaid-for 
benefit to Energy West. Commercial Fixtures and Furnishings, 564 P.2d at 774, quoted 
in Knight, 748 P.2d at 1101. 
Equity, after all, is not based solely on the fact that one party benefits by the act of 
another. "The mere fact that a third person benefits from a contract between two others 
does not make such third person liable in quasi-contract, unjust enrichment or 
restitution." Southern Title Guar. Co. v. Bethers, 761 P.2d 951, 954 (Utah App. 
1988)(citations omitted). Instead, or in addition, the remedy is restorative, meaning that 
any benefit enjoyed by Energy West must have been something for which it did not part 
with some kind of consideration. American Towers, 930 P.2d at 1192 (underlying 
purpose of the remedy is to "restore to a plaintiff a benefit unjustly enjoyed by a 
defendant"). 
Neither fact nor inference suggests any contact between Energy West and 
Nickerson capable of sustaining these or any claims. Weyher hired Nickerson under an 
express subcontract covering the Project pumps. (R. 286, 121 ]fi[6-7; 173 f^l[5, 7, 9). 
Energy West paid its general contract in full. (R. 305 Tf9; 239 Tf9; 218 TflO; 278 (depo. p. 
33). It therefore never retained or used anything for which it did not pay. See American 
45805lvl 
-13-
Towers, 930 P.2d at 1193 (retention of benefits under construction contracts not unjust 
when the contract price was paid). 
C. The trial court properly granted summary judgment on the repossession 
claim. 
Nickerson alleged that its pumps are "personal property," that it was entitled to 
"regain possession" or to "repossess the pumps" and "resell them and apply the proceeds 
to" what is owed. (R. 72 1ffl31-33). 
Whether or not true in the abstract, these allegations do not support in this case a 
claim against Energy West. It was undisputed that three months after the pumps were 
delivered CVSSD assumed full ownership and operation of the treatment plant—pumps 
included. (R. 305 Tf8, 239^| 8, 218 f9, 234). When this action was filed, therefore, 
Energy West did not "possess" the pumps; CVSSD did, and Nickerson did not name 
CVSSD in the action. 
On its own, the trial court ruled that: 
The pumps delivered by plaintiff are personal property. 
Plaintiff retained no security interest in the pumps. Pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-401, unless otherwise explicitly 
agreed, title passes to the buyer at the time and place at which 
the seller completes his performance with reference to the 
physical delivery of goods. Title to the pumps passed to 
Energy West when the pumps were delivered and installed at 
the Project. 
(R. 306). 
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The applicability of section 70A-2-401 was neither briefed nor argued below. A 
Nickerson invoice (made part of the record when Nickerson filed its Rule 26(a) Initial 
Disclosures, see R. 23-36) states that "ownership, title and right of unrestricted 
repossession . . . shall remain with the Nickerson Co., Inc. until paid for in full." (R. 32). 
Weyher is the purchaser on the invoice. Id. Nickerson did not include this evidence in 
its summary judgment papers. See R. 172-200 (Nickerson's principal memo with 
exhibits), R. 285-88 (Nickerson's reply memo). 
A Nickerson Affidavit, with exhibits, was used by Nickerson in connection with 
its summary judgment against Weyher, (R. 120-29), and re-used by Energy West on its 
subsequent cross-motion against Nickerson. (R. 205-15, cited by Energy West at R. 239, 
ffl[5-7). The invoice found at R. 32 is not among the exhibits to that affidavit. The 
purchase orders at R. 128-29 (exhibits to Nickerson's affidavit) show plainly that Weyher 
is the purchaser. The "Conditions of Purchase" portion of the purchase order (R. 129) is 
illegible. We cannot tell whether title is expressly reserved.6 
Either way, Nickerson knew at least by July of 2006, when it subpoened records 
from CVSSD, that neither Energy West nor Weyher possessed the pumps and that 
CVSSD did. (R. 189-90)("After the project was completed [CVSSD] accepted the 
project, including the pumps supplied by Nickerson Company."). See also R. 192. 
6
 Another, slightly clearer copy is attached to Weyher's Answer and Counterclaim (R. 
13-14), but the fine print is still difficult to make out, although consistent with Weyher's 
allegation at R. 9 f4, it does appear to impose liability on Nickerson for "late delivery." 
(R. 14). Presumably, Nickerson has the originals of these items. 
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Nickerson never tried to add CVSSD to the action. Accordingly, regardless of whether 
the trial court's application of section 70A-2-401 was correct, summary judgment was 
proper on the repossession claim for the simple and undisputed reason that Energy West 
had neither possession nor control of the pumps after August 23, 2005, and that CVSSD 
did, facts that Nickerson knew no later than March of 2006, just three months after it filed 
this action. (R. 305 | 8 , R. 192, R. 1). 
D. Nickerson's equity-based arguments here cannot overcome the legal 
consequences of (1) its express contract with Weyher and (2) its failure to 
exhaust legal remedies. 
Recognizing its lack of privity with Energy West—and in spite of its express 
contract with Weyher—Nickerson invokes equity at every turn. It contends here as it did 
below that Energy West's mere knowledge of "the existence of Nickerson both prior to 
and after the 'settlement agreement' and transfer of the pumps to CVSSD" creates a 
quasi-contract claim. (Nickerson Brf. at 11). Based on this knowledge of Nickerson's 
"existence," Nickerson concludes that "[f]or Energy West to retain the benefit without 
payment of the value of the pumps would be unfair, unjust and inequitable " Id. This 
second statement is true enough (although it plainly does not follow from the first), and 
would pack legal significance if the undisputed facts supported its unstated major 
premise—that Energy West did not pay its full contract price, which by definition 
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included the cost of the pumps. Energy West in fact did pay its contract (R. 305 f9), and 
more, when it paid Weyher an additional $33,000 to settle a dispute. (R. 194 ^fl).7 
Nickerson next argues that a contract implied in fact is supported by the claim that 
"actions by Energy West assisted Weyher to deprive Nickerson of its property." 
(Nickerson Brf. at 12). It is not clear what these "actions" were. Nickerson seems to rely 
on Energy West's settlement with Weyher, as though that undisputed fact creates a cause 
of action in favor of Nickerson. We cannot find a legal theory that supports such a claim, 
and Nickerson offers none. 
As explained above, the only circumstances sufficient to permit Nickerson to look 
beyond its express agreement with Weyher—and the legal remedies that flow from that 
agreement, including a direct action on the Payment Bond—are that Energy West misled 
Nickerson, requested its services or otherwise engaged Nickerson in such a manner as to 
create an express relationship or duty between them. Commercial Fixtures, 564 P.2d at 
774. Under those imagined circumstances, Nickerson might have had at least a colorable 
claim. 
7
 The Energy West—Weyher dispute included "the ramifications and responsibility for a 
delay in the delivery of certain required pumps . . . ." (R. 194 fB). The issue of 
Nickerson's delay is the basis of Weyher's unlitigated counterclaim. (R. 9-10). Related 
to this, Nickerson argues that its claims against Energy West are advanced by the fact that 
the settlement with Weyher acknowledges that Nickerson had not been paid. (Nickerson 
Brf. at 11; cf. R. 194 ^|2). Nickerson identifies no theory of recovery created by these 
facts. Settlement between A and B, while B has a dispute with C, does not, without 
more, create a claim in favor of C against A. 
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It was and remains undisputed that Energy West had no such contact with 
Nickerson. Moreover, Nickerson's attempt to bootstrap into an implied agreement with 
Energy West is forever barred by its express contract with Weyher and its failure to 
pursue the statutory Payment Bond remedy. 
E. The court should reject Nickerson's new theory of contract implied in 
fact. 
An implied in fact contract (the other half of quantum meruit) is a contract, 
"established by conduct." Uhrhahn Const v. Hopkins, 2008 UT App 41,118, 179 P.3d 
808, quoting Davies, 746 P.2d at 269. Its elements are (1) a request to perform (work., 
services, etc.), (2) the performing party's expectation of compensation, and (3) 
knowledge by the defendant that "the plaintiff expected compensation." Id. 
Nickerson did not plead a contract implied in fact against Energy West. {See R. 
68-73). This alternative quantum meruit theory was not even mentioned by Nickerson 
until its reply summary judgment memorandum, (R. 287), and even then its elements are 
not briefed. It is mentioned in a similarly perfunctory fashion here. (Nickerson Brf. at 
12). 
In fairness, the Amended Complaint does invoke one of the elements. Nickerson 
alleged that it supplied the pumps "with the expectation of being compensated therefor. . 
. ." (R. 71 Tf22). Nickerson does not allege that Energy West requested that performance, 
but it does allege that Weyher did. (R. 70 |15). Nickerson's second claim reads more 
like an attempt to blend its quantum meruit theories. More important for purposes of 
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summary judgment and this appeal, however, the undisputed facts establish that Energy 
West did not request from Nickerson any services, work or the pumps. Pursuant to its 
contract with Nickerson, Weyher ordered the pumps. (R. 239 [^6, R. 314 ^ [6). 
Giving Nickerson the benefit of substantial doubt that it pled and properly briefed 
and thereby preserved an implied in fact contract theory, the claim fails nevertheless. 
The lack of any actionable contact between Nickerson and Energy West defeats the 
claim. Energy West never requested Nickerson to do anything. See, e.g., Knight, 748 
P.2d at 110 (no request for services or other dealings between the parties). 
Furthermore, Nickerson's express contract with Weyher bars an implied in fact 
contract with as much force as it does the implied in law version. See, Sachs v. Lesser, 
2007 UT App 169, ^|21, 207 P.3d 1215 (recovery under either version of quantum meruit 
"presupposes that no enforceable contract exists"). 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Nickerson ys express contract and unpursued and now time-barred 
legal remedies bar the quantum meruit claims against Energy West. 
Nickerson's theme is that, standing alone, Weyher's inability to answer the 
judgment against it triggers a claim in equity and a right to recover from someone. The 
theory finds no support in the law; nor should it. Equity does not insure against 
nonpayment on an express contract. Rather, it provides a remedy in limited 
circumstances where there is no express contract and services are rendered but not paid 
for. The law fills that void with a remedy of its own—an action in restitution or a 
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contract implied in fact—restoring the balance by awarding reasonable value for services 
rendered. See, e.g., EPIC, 2007 UT 72, flO. Here, the parties allocated their respective 
risks with express contracts covering the entire Project. With the Payment Bond in place, 
Nickerson had but failed to invoke the insurance policy it now seeks. The express 
contracts and their accompanying legal remedies bar Nickerson's appeal to equity. 
Accordingly, the Summary Judgment Order should be affirmed. 
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